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I. INTRODUCTION

After Mack Brown resigned,1 the University of Texas (“Texas”)
looked to hire a new head football coach for its premier college football
program. The school set its eyes on Charlie Strong, head football coach
for the University of Louisville. For Texas to successfully hire Strong,
his contract required a buyout payment from Strong to the University
of Louisville for $4.375 million. 2
In the world of athletics, this situation was not unusual: 3
typically, the new university employer reimbursed the coach for the
*
Harry W. Walborsky Professor, Florida State University College of Law.
1.
At the time, it was reported that the President of the University forced Mack Brown to
resign. See Pat Forde, Source: Mack Brown Forced out as Texas Coach After President Withdrew
Support, YAHOO! (Dec. 23, 2013), available at http://sports.yahoo.com/news/source--mack-brownforced-out-as-texas-coach-after-president-withdrew-support-005700558.html,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/8UPN-BPK6 (last visited March 10, 2015 at 1:17 PM) (“[T]he 16-year Mack
Brown Era at Texas was terminated not by the coach himself, but at the insistence of an
embattled school president.”).
2.
See Steve Berkowitz, Schools Buying Coach’s Contracts Instead of Buying Out, USA
TODAY (Nov. 19, 2014), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/11/19/
college-football-coaches-compensation-buyouts-texas-louisville-alabama/19271987/, archived at
http://perma.cc/5NY4-35JE (last visited March 10, 2015 at 1:20 PM) (describing the buyout of
Charlie Strong’s contract with Louisville).
3.
See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Will the Tax Man Cometh to Coach Rodriguez,
120 TAX NOTES 474 (2008) (describing the highly publicized move of Coach Richard Rodriguez
from West Virginia University to the University of Michigan).

143

144

VAND. L. REV. EN BANC

[Vol. 68:143

buyout or directly paid the buyout to the old university employer.
Under either arrangement many schools took the position that such
payments, whether made directly or as a reimbursement, were
includible in the coach’s income for federal tax purposes. 4
The University of Texas, however, accomplished its desired
result (hiring Strong as head football coach) in a seemingly unusual
manner. Technically, no buyout payment was made. Instead, Texas,
with the approval of Strong, purchased the rights to Strong’s
employment contract from the University of Louisville.5 Texas claimed
that no buyout payment was ever made because the contract was
never bought out. Instead, Texas became Strong’s employer and then
the two parties renegotiated Strong’s employment contract.6 The
purchase price of the employment contract was exactly the same as
the contractual buyout payment—$4.375 million.7 This was no
coincidence and demonstrated that the true purpose of the payment
was to “avoid taxes for coaches and schools.”8
This Essay explains that such arrangements do not improve
the prospects for excluding the payment from the coach’s taxable
income. The taxation issue applies uniformly in a buyout, regardless
of whether (i) the new university employer provides a direct payment,
(ii) the new university employer reimburses the coach, or (iii) as the
University of Texas recently did, the new university employer buys
the employment contract from the old university employer. The
substance of all three arrangements is identical. This does not lead to
the conclusion that the buyout payment is taxable to the coach,
however. Instead, as discussed in Part IV, there are two independent
policy justifications that counsel against taxing the coach—regardless
of which of the three arrangements is used.

4.
See Steve Berkowitz, Tax-Free Buyouts? Coaches Take a Chance with the IRS, USA
TODAY (Nov. 6, 2013), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/11/06/
college-football-coach-pay-buyouts-taxes-irs/3449639/, archived at http://perma.cc/EK33-9UJH
(last visited March 10, 2015 at 1:26 PM) (stating that the coaches faced responsibility for their
contract buyouts). However, I argue that such payments should not be included in the coach’s
income. See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Tax Consequences When a New Employer Bears
the Cost of the Employee’s Terminating a Prior Employment Relationship, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 539
(2007). This debate is further explained infra Part IV.
5.
See Berkowitz, supra note 2 (detailing Charlie Strong’s signing with the University of
Texas and buyout from the University of Louisville).
6.
The University of Louisville followed the same structure when it replaced Strong and
hired its new head football coach, Bobby Petrino, from the University of Western Kentucky. The
school also paid the exact buyout amount in order to purchase Petrino’s contract. Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Id. Since the “schools” are tax-exempt entities, it is not clear what taxes they are
“avoiding.” One explanation is that since the coach avoids taxes, the school avoids having to
gross up the reimbursement of the buyout.
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II. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF A BUYOUT: THE SERVICE’S POSITION
It is well established under regulations promulgated by the
Internal Revenue Service (the “Service”) that an employee must
include in income the payment or reimbursement of an employee’s
personal obligation.9 In the typical buyout scenario, the coach pays the
buyout directly to the old university employer and is then reimbursed
by the new university employer. There is no question that the
contractually required buyout payment is a personal obligation of the
coach.
Under this construct of the transaction, the coach may also
deduct the cost of the buyout as a business expense under Internal
Revenue Code § 162.10 Since the coach is allowed a deduction, it
appears that it makes no difference to the coach whether he has
income or not on account of the payment of the buyout. If that
deduction were not subject to any limitation (i.e., if it were fully
deductible), it would offset the coach’s income from the payment of the
buyout and so it would make no difference to the coach whether the
payment is excluded from his income or included in his income with
an offsetting deduction.
The problem, as discussed in more detail in Part III, is that the
Service would likely take the position that the deduction should be
classified as a miscellaneous itemized deduction.11 Miscellaneous
itemized deductions are subject to several limitations. First, such
deductions are deductible only to the extent that the aggregate
amount exceeds two percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. 12
Second, they are subject to the overall limitation on most itemized
deductions under Internal Revenue Code § 68.13 Finally, the largest
issue is that miscellaneous itemized deductions are completely
disallowed for purposes of the Alternative Minimum Tax.14 With such
9.
See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 731 (1929) (holding that
payment of income tax by an employer constitutes taxable income for the employee); see also Rev.
Rul. 70-282, 1970-1 C.B. 16 (stating that an amount paid by an employer to cure an employee’s
indebtedness is taxable income for the employee); Rev. Rul. 66-41, 1966-1 C.B. 233 (stating that
an employment agency fee reimbursed by the employer is taxable income for the employee).
10. 26 U.S.C. § 162 allows individuals to deduct the cost of “ordinary and necessary”
business expenses. A payment made to end an employment contract is deductible under Code §
162. See Streger v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 227, 231 (1999) (allowing a taxpayer to deduct the full cost
of malpractice insurance for his business in the year that his business terminated).
11. See infra Part III (explaining the IRS’s likely position regarding the University of
Texas’s purchasing of the employment contract rather than paying the buyout).
12. 26 U.S.C. § 67(a) (West 2012).
13. If a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income for a taxable year exceeds an “applicable amount,”
then certain itemized deductions (including all miscellaneous itemized deductions) will be
reduced. See I.R.C. § 68 (West 2012).
14. 26 U.S.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(I) (2012).
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large buyout payments required for many coaches, it is almost certain
that these coaches will be subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax
system. Therefore, under this interpretation of the tax results, there
are likely two unfavorable outcomes: either the deduction for the
buyout would not completely wash out the new employer’s
reimbursement or the buyout would not be deductible at all.
III. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF PURCHASING THE CONTRACT: THE
SERVICE’S LIKELY POSITION
There is an argument that the University of Texas’s new
arrangement—purchasing the employment contract rather than
paying the buyout—may allow the coach to exclude the buyout
payment from his or her income. The coach could argue that the
contractual buyout was never paid and the transaction was solely
between the new and old universities. Since the buyout was not paid,
the new university employer never paid a personal obligation of the
coach. Thus, the argument goes, there is no income to the coach and
the tax issue is avoided.
The Service, however, is unlikely to agree with this position.15
Under the doctrine of substance over form,16 the Service will
15. There is an interesting question as to the tax consequences for Strong in the unlikely
circumstance that the Service were to accept the form of the transaction. Somewhat surprisingly,
it has been reported that the University of Texas did not impose a buyout provision when it
renegotiated Strong’s contract (other than for some assistant coach salaries that would still be
due). See Chris Hummer, Charlie Strong: How Does the Contract of Texas’ New Coach Compare
with Texas A&M’s Kevin Sumlin’s Deal, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan. 14, 2014), available
at http://collegesportsblog.dallasnews.com/2014/01/charlie-strong-how-does-the-contract-of-texasnew-coach-compare-with-texas-ams-kevin-sumlins-deal.html/, archived at http://perma.cc/U74L3XWC. There is a question then of whether removing the buyout provision from the prior
contract would trigger cancellation of debt income to Strong. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 61(a)(12), 108
(2012) (detailing discharge of indebtedness). There is an exclusion, however, of cancellation of
debt income if payment of the debt would have been deductible. 26 U.S.C. § 108(e)(2) (2012). The
question is whether that exclusion applies only if the payment would have been fully
deductible—that is whether it applies to a deduction whose amount is subject to restrictions. As
noted in this Essay, an unreimbursed buyout payment by Strong would be characterized as a
miscellaneous itemized deduction and would, at best, be subject to limitations and, at worst, be
fully disallowed under the Alternative Minimum Tax system. The author believes that the
exclusion applies to all deductible items regardless of whether they are subject to limitations,
but that is an open question. Also note that even if the University of Texas had imposed the
same dollar amount of buyout requirement as was in the contract with the University of
Louisville, Strong would have had cancellation of debt income because the cancelled debt was
owed immediately whereas the new buyout debt would be both in the future and contingent.
16. When a transaction or series of steps to a transaction have no economic significance
and are designed to obtain favorable tax consequences, the tax law will recharacterize the
transaction (or the steps) so as to reflect the economic substance of what was accomplished. See
Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 228, 265–66 (2009) rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Consol. Edison Co. of New York & Subsidiaries v. United States, 703 F.3d
1367, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The substance over form doctrine requires the courts to determine
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presumably recharacterize the transaction to reflect the economic
substance of the deal. In this case, the substance of the transaction is
clear: the new university employer paid the buyout, thereby allowing
the coach to be hired. It will bolster the Service’s argument that the
“purchase price” of the contract was exactly equal to the required
contractual buyout requirement.
Therefore, it makes little difference for federal income tax
purposes how the universities and the sought-after coach structure
the transaction. Under all three arrangements discussed in this
Essay,17 the economic substance of the deal is the same: the new
university employer is satisfying the personal obligation of the coach
in order to allow the coach to terminate his old employment contract
and sign a new one with the new university. The University of Texas’s
unusual arrangement has not solved the tax “problem” (if one exists).
In other words, assuming the Service’s position is correct, the result
will be the same regardless of the arrangement—the coach will have
income in the form of a personal obligation satisfied by the new
university and the coach’s corresponding business deduction for that
payment will be classified as a miscellaneous itemized deduction. To
the contrary, as discussed below, there are policy justifications for
excluding the buyout payment from a coach’s income.18 Again the
structure of the deal should not affect the tax consequences. Therefore,
if either of the policy justifications is correct, a coach will not have
income for the buyout payment regardless of how the deal is
structured.
IV. REASONS TO EXCLUDE INCOME
A. Non-Itemized Deduction
As noted in Part II, if a coach was able to take a business
expense deduction without any limitations for the payment (or deemed
payment) of the buyout, there would be no tax concern. If the coach
can classify the business expense deduction that he or she receives on
account of the buyout payment as a non-itemized deduction19 rather
than a miscellaneous itemized deduction, then the coach may fully
the ‘true nature’ of the transaction to ensure that tax consequences are based upon a
transaction’s actual substance and not mere labels.” (internal citations omitted)).
17. See supra Part I (discussing three typical buyout scenarios that occur during the hiring
of new college football coaches).
18. Much of this discussion stems from an earlier piece. See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 4.
19. Non-itemized deductions are fully deductible under both the “regular” income tax and
the Alternative Minimum Tax systems. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 56, 58, 63, 67, 68 (2012) (detailing
taxable income and deductions under the regular income tax and the Alternative Minimum Tax).
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offset the income recognized by the new university employer satisfying
the buyout. This key issue involves the classification rules of Internal
Revenue Code § 62. Under that provision, most trade or business
expenses classify as non-itemized deductions. There is an exception for
business expenses incurred by a taxpayer whose trade or business
“consist[s] of the performance of services by the taxpayer as an
employee.”20 Clearly, football coaches are employees of the university.
There is an exception to the exception, however. An employee business
expense reverts back to a non-itemized deduction if the employer
reimburses such an expense.21
Obviously, a coach is reimbursed for the expense of the buyout,
but the reimbursement comes from the new employer. Thus, the new
university employer reimburses the coach for an expense that the
coach had prior to becoming an employee of the new university. That
is, the employer reimburses the employee for an expense that was
incurred while in the service of a different employer. The issue is
whether that matters for purposes of § 62.
The Treasury Regulation corresponding to § 62 states that the
services must be provided by the employee in his capacity as an
employee of the employer who reimburses the costs.22 This regulation
should not be applied literally, however. To understand why, it is
useful to examine why unreimbursed and reimbursed employee
expenses are treated so differently for tax purposes. Congress is
concerned that unreimbursed employee expenses might not be
legitimate business expenses.23 If the expenses were legitimate, it is
Congress’s position that then the employer likely would offer
reimbursement.24
Thus,
rather
than
completely
disallow
unreimbursed expenses, Congress set severe restrictions on their
deductibility.

20. 26 U.S.C. § 62(a)(1) (2012).
21. There is a requirement (satisfied in these cases) that the employee substantiate the
expense. See Treas. Reg. § 1.62-2(b).
22. Id.:
For purposes of determining “adjusted gross income,” section 62(a)(2)(A) allows an
employee a deduction for expenses . . . paid by the employee, in connection with the
performance of services as an employee of the employer, under a reimbursement or
other expense allowance arrangement with a payor (the employer, its agent, or a third
party).
23. See Jeffrey H. Kahn, Beyond the Little Dutch Boy: An Argument for Structural Change
in Tax Deduction Classification, 80 WASH. L. REV. 1, 49–50 (2005) (“Congress has opined that
employers will reimburse any legitimate trade or business expense, thus implying that anything
not reimbursed is not sufficiently related to the business and must have personal elements.”).
24. See S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 79 (1996) (“The committee believes that generally it is
appropriate to disallow deduction for employee business expenses because employers reimburse
employees for those expenses that are most necessary for employment.”).
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When an employer reimburses the expenses, the Service
generally accepts this as third-party verification that the expenses
were legitimate.25 Congress is willing to eliminate the limitations and
classify the expenses as non-itemized when a third party (like the
employer) has signaled that the expenses are valid. However, it is not
enough merely that the employer reimbursed the expense because it is
possible that the reimbursement may be a method of compensation.
Thus, the expense must be related to the business of the employer.
That is, the employer must have a valid business reason, other than
compensating the employee, for reimbursing the expense.26 The
expense must benefit the employer in some manner other than merely
compensating the employee.27
In the buyout context, the benefit to the new university
employer is clear. In order to hire the coach, the buyout must be paid.
The new university then has a direct benefit from the expense and it
makes no difference that the payment also benefits the employee. 28
Thus, even though the new university employer reimbursed an
expense that the coach incurred while employed elsewhere, the
payment meets the policy behind granting non-itemized status. It is
both reimbursed by the employer (satisfying the third party
verification requirement) and it provides a substantial business
benefit to the employer (functioning beyond mere employee
compensation). As such, the payment by the coach to terminate the old
employment contract should be classified as a non-itemized deduction.
As a non-itemized deduction, it will completely offset the income
recognized when the new university employer pays the former
university employer or reimburses the employee for the buyout.29

25. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 717–21 (2007) (detailing situations in which employerreimbursed expenses are excludible and/or deductible).
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a) suggests this with the language “in connection with the
performance of services as an employee of the employer.” Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a).
27. The Service uses a similar construction involving Code § 132. In determining whether
an exclusion for a working condition fringe benefit is applicable, the Service, citing language
similar to the Code § 62 regulations requiring that the expense be incurred in connection with
the employer who provides the benefit, stated that the requirement is satisfied when the
employer “derives a substantial business benefit from the provision of the property or services
that is distinct from the benefit that it would derive from the mere payment of additional
compensation . . . .” Rev. Rul. 92-69, 1992-2 C.B. 51.
28. It is also irrelevant that the Service requires the expense to be capitalized rather than
immediately deducted. As universities are tax-exempt entities, it is not an issue whether it is
deductible by the employer.
29. Kahn & Kahn, supra note 4, at 542–49.
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B. Incidental Third Party Beneficiary
There is another policy justification for excluding the buyout
payment from the coach’s income. The reasoning of this justification is
illustrated by a simple example. Assume that a law student hopes to
land a job in New York City. If the law student spends his own money
traveling to New York in order to interview with a law firm, those
travel expenses are not deductible. In contrast, if the law firm
reimburses the law student (or directly pays) for the travel expenses,
the student would not be required to include the reimbursement or
payment in income.30
These seemingly inconsistent results are nonetheless
appropriate because the primary purpose behind the reimbursement
or payment is to benefit the law firm. The law student obviously
benefits as well (since he or she no longer has to pay for the travel
expenses out of pocket), but the reimbursement is not meant to
compensate the student. Instead, the firm spends the money in order
to determine whether to hire the student and, if offered a job, to
convince the student to accept it. While the student benefits, the law
firm’s purpose is to benefit itself.
The coach’s situation is analogous. While the coach obviously
benefits from the new university employer’s paying for the buyout, the
new university makes the payment not as compensation to the coach,
but instead for valid business reasons to benefit the university.
V. CONCLUSION
The University of Texas’s arrangement of directly buying the
University of Louisville coach’s employment contract does not relieve
the coach’s tax requirement to include the buyout in income. In this
situation, the Service can argue that the substance of the transaction
overpowers its form. The Service will likely recharacterize the
transaction as a payment of the buyout funds to the coach who uses
the funds to pay the buyout to his old university employer.
Despite this recharacterization, however, the payment by a
university to buy out a new coach’s contract should not require the
coach to include the payment in income. The payment should qualify
as a non-itemized deduction since it functions beyond mere
compensation and satisfies the third-party verification requirement.
Further, such payment may incidentally benefit the coach, but its
fundamental purpose is to benefit the new university employer. If
either argument is accepted, a coach would not pay taxes on the
30.

Rev. Rul. 63-77, 1963-1 C.B. 177.
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buyout. There may be other reasons to prefer to structure the buyout
in this manner,31 but it will not improve the case for exclusion of
taxable income to the coach.

31. One possible explanation is that schools would prefer to not include the buyout
payment amount as part of the compensation paid to the coach in the USA Today’s annual
survey of compensation paid to NCAA coaches. For the compensation list, see 2014 NCAAF
Coach Salaries, USA TODAY, available at http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/, archived at
http://perma.cc/64H2-WLNC (last visited March 10, 2015 at 2:03 PM).

